Preventing or Producing a Bank Liquidity Crisis: Hobgoblin of Small Minds
As our heartland ancestors have in the past, we view the eastern financial centers with great consternation. Their rules seem to be both special and readily malleable. Fixed rules of law regarding failure become fluid rules of adjustment for some to fit the exigent circumstances at hand and investors both here and abroad. For one group of (investment and indirectly the money center) banks, we observe one set of criteria for Schumpeter’s creative destruction, the great cleanser of capitalism. For the community banks, we have another set of rules. For investment banks, there appears to be no amount of liquidity that currently cannot be provided to save the American day and their collective money center brethren. On the other hand, the community banks are now beginning to experience financial regulators dutifully following orders from the nation’s capital. In many cases, the regulators are rightfully, if not zealously, restricting certain bank’s conduct with various administrative orders in order to avoid even worse consequences down the road.
As a frequent consequence of many of these detailed administrative orders, a community bank’s capital is impacted and the once well capitalized community bank is then deemed to be only adequately capitalized due to past or anticipated losses. Suddenly, the community bank’s access to sources of liquidity becomes constricted by regulation. The very continuation or even utilization of brokered deposits become subject to regulatory approval even though no questions were raised previously regarding those sources of funding. Additionally, the Federal Home Loan Bank’s advances, which have become the mother’s milk of funding community banks, become more stringent. In these cases, the community bank regulators are required to do just the opposite of the regulators of the investment banks. In effect, the regulatory rules of the road for community banks may escalate a liquidity crisis just when the smaller community bank needs time and liquidity to resolve the issues it faces and raise capital.
How is this different treatment fair or equitable? Investment banks and indirectly money center banks are flooded with liquidity while smaller community banks face a liquidity crisis brought on not by the markets but by the well intentioned regulators hoping to protect the system. Ironically, the community banks with more direct regulatory oversight have their liquidity options diminished by such regulation, and the investment banks and G.S.E.s which are not subject to such regulation, receive additional liquidity from regulatory or governmental agencies. Admittedly, consistency is indeed the hobgoblin of small minds in the heartland, but without some equitable reconciliation of these disparate treatments, the uneven moral hazards of today will become political and institutional hazards destabilizing tomorrow.
-Howard Hagen